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Abstract: The issue of fault diagnostics is a dominant factor concerning current engineering
systems. Information regarding possible failures is required in order to minimize disruption
caused to functionality. A method proposed in this paper utilizes digraphs to model the
information flow within an application system. Digraphs are composed from a set of nodes
representing system process variables or component failure modes. The nodes are connected
by signed edges thus illustrating the influence, be it positive or negative, one node has on
another. System fault diagnostics is conducted through a procedure of back-tracing in the
digraph from a known deviating variable. A computational method has been developed to
conduct this process. Comparisons are made between retrieved transmitter readings and
those expected while the system is in a known operating mode. Any noted deviations are
assumed to indicate the presence of a failure. The current paper looks in detail at the
application of the digraph diagnostic method to an industrially based test stand of an aircraft
fuel system. This research includes transient system effects; the rate of change of a parameter
is taken into consideration as a means of monitoring the system dynamically. The validity of
the results achieved, through performing fault diagnostics based on the use of a digraph
model, is evaluated. Finally, the effectiveness and scalability issues associated with the
application of the method are addressed.
Keywords: system fault diagnostics, digraphs, aircraft fuel system
1 INTRODUCTION
With the growing intolerance towards failures within
systems fault diagnosis has become a fundamental
facet of engineering applications. It is concerned
with isolating the underlying causal faults leading
to an observable effect in a monitored process.
Effective detection of system faults aids in decreasing
downtime and thus improves operational stability [1].
Methods employed to identify faults can be classified
according to model-based, case-based, and rule-
based strategies. The emphasis of the research pre-
sented in this paper lies within model-based dia-
gnosis (MBD), where models of a system are used
as the basis for performing fault diagnostics. MBD is
particularly suited to systems whose architecture
comprises either the same or similar components.
Novak et al. [2] focus on generating a sequential
diagnosis tool (SDT). The SDT highlights a pros-
pective fault through running a series of tests at a
particular point in time. This rule-based approach
has been proven to be effective when determin-
ing single faults in a system with a known period of
inactivity. However, difficulties arise when consider-
ing the complexity issue surrounding dependency
in multiple fault combinations. Shakeri et al. [3]
successfully extend the sequential testing tech-
nique through attempting to determine multiple fault
causes for a given test. From the results, further
research is required to consider both unreliable tests
and the combining of diagnostic results to form mul-
tiple failure options in fault tolerant systems (systems
displaying redundancy).
Failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) is an
established system safety analysis technique. Attempts
have been made to automate the process and thus
increase its effectiveness through decreasing the time
required to perform the analysis [4, 5]. Limitations
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have involved difficulties with the efficiency and scal-
ability of the algorithms utilized. A different approach,
proposed by Papadopoulos et al. [6], considers trans-
lating the information contained within a network of
interconnected fault trees into FMEA-style tables.
Variability, with regard to performance, is exhibited
with increased system complexity.
Digraphs, also known as signed directed graphs
[7, 8], can illustrate specific fault propagations through
a system. The issues involved with diagnosing single
faults in systems are addressed by Rao [9]. Iverson
and Pattersine-Hine [10] extend this approach by con-
sidering the combination of two failures via an AND
gate, and identify the potential for real-time auto-
mated monitoring and diagnosis.
The characteristics associated withmodern-day sys-
tems require fault diagnostic strategies to incorporate
both adaptability and the identification of multiple
faults [11]. Modern systems are of varying size and
complexity and are thus usually required to operate
in more than one mode. It is therefore considered
beneficial for an ideal diagnostic procedure to incor-
porate an adaptable scope.
The present paper applies the digraph method to a
simulation test stand which is representative of an
aircraft fuel system (section 4). The purpose of an air-
craft fuel system is reliably to provide the required
amount of fuel to the engines during all phases of
flight. A fuel system is thus integral to an aircraft
set-up. The main issues affecting the fault diagnostics
of an aircraft fuel system on a macro scale cover fuel
storage, distribution, dump, and variable transmit-
ters (e.g. level transmitter). The analysis conducted
addresses fuel storage and distribution through tak-
ing three operating modes into account. Fuel dump
is considered during the drain phase. For the pur-
poses of this research it is assumed that the variable
transmitters provide reliable readings.
The issues surrounding multiple faults and dyna-
mic analysis are also addressed. A brief insight into
digraphs through considering their representation
of fault propagations in a system is provided in sec-
tions 2 and 3. System fault diagnostics taking into
account transient effects and the results yielded
through automating the procedure are reviewed in
sections 4 and 5. The conclusions of the research
are presented in section 6.
2 THE DIGRAPH METHOD
A digraph [12] is constructed from a set of nodes and
edges, which are used to illustrate the ‘cause–effect’
relationships present within a system [13–15]. The
nodes represent system process variables or compon-
ent failure modes, and the edges connecting the nodes
illustrate the interrelationships that exist between
components in a system. Digraph nodes contain an
alphanumeric label which symbolizes a specific pro-
cess variable or component failure mode. With regard
to process variable nodes, the numeric section of the
label corresponds to a precise location in the applica-
tion system. The precursor to the numeric section
indicates the type of process variable the node repres-
ents. Examples of process variables include temper-
ature, mass flow, pressure, and signals from sensors.
Following the same order, these would be represented
in nodes by the precursors T, M, P, and S.
Process variable deviations [16, 17] are tradition-
ally expressed as one of five discrete values: þ10,
þ1, 0, 1, and 10; these correspond to large high,
small high, normal, small low, and large low devia-
tions. These values are also used to describe the effect
a disturbance (e.g. failure mode) has on a particular
variable. Two further values (þ5/5) are utilized dur-
ing the development of the fuel rig system digraph
to allow for the inclusion of partial failure modes.
The causal relationships between process variable
nodes remain as either non-acting, direct acting, or
inverse acting. This component failure mode devi-
ation addition leads to the effective application of
digraphs in the fault diagnostics procedure involv-
ing the fuel rig system. The disturbances caused by
complete failures, such as a pipe blockage or valve
closure for example, are represented through utiliz-
ing the discrete variable ‘10’.
A simple digraph is illustrated in Fig. 1. In the dia-
gram it is noted that T1 and T2, the nodes, are con-
nected by three edges. The alphanumeric code T1
represents temperature at location one. The edge
with a gain of þ1 is considered to be the normal
edge since this represents the relationship which is
‘usually true’. The second and third edges in the illus-
tration are termed conditional edges since their
relationship is only true whenever the condition
represented by ‘:’ exists. It must be noted that only
one edge is true at any time.
A generalized procedure outlining the main steps
involved in developing a system digraph is provided.
The derivation of a digraph is well documented [13]
and involves two basic steps.
1. Step one: system analysis. First, the system under
investigation is defined. A specific number is allo-
cated to each component thus developing a
straightforward location reference approach for
process variables and component failure modes
at a given point. All relevant component failures
Fig. 1 Simple digraph representation
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of the system are compiled with a failure mode
code attached to each fault. The system is then
separated into sub-units.
2. Step two: digraph generation. The unit digraph
models for the sub-units, previously noted in
step one, are generated. All process variable devi-
ations that could have a potential effect on the
variables in the model are taken into considera-
tion. The system digraph is formed by connecting
common variables from the sub-unit models.
3 SYSTEM FAULT DIAGNOSTICS STRATEGY
Emphasis is placed on the application of digraphs in
the field of fault diagnostics. The fault diagnostics
process is conducted using the system digraph
model. System behaviour is monitored through com-
piling sensor data (e.g. via a level transmitter). In a
given mode of operation the application system has
a set of expected sensor readings. These are com-
pared with the actual system readings during the dia-
gnostic procedure to identify if any deviations are
present.
1. Step one: determination of system deviations. The
sensor readings which are expected while the sys-
tem is in a known operating mode, for example
mode ON, are noted. The current sensor readings
from the system are retrieved and then compared
with those expected, to determine if any devia-
tions exist.
2. Step two: flagging of non-deviations. Non-deviating
sensor nodes and associated digraph sections are
‘flagged’. It is assumed that a non-deviating reading
indicates the absence of a failure.
3. Step three: back-tracing process. Fault diagnosis
involves back-tracing through the system digraph
from a specific sensor node which represents the
location of the given deviation. An unexpected pro-
cess deviation within a system is represented by
‘highlighting’ the respective deviating node in the
digraph. Subsequent propagation of the deviation
through the system is conducted by marking all
of the nodes which were affected by the initial
highlighting. The back-tracing process ceases once
either (a) a flagged section is reached or (b) no
more back-tracing is possible. For multiple deviat-
ing sensors the diagnostic results obtained through
back-tracing from each deviating node are ANDed
together.
All potential fault causes are listed at the end of the
fault diagnostics procedure.
A simple back-tracing example is related to Fig. 2. It
is assumed that a large negative deviation is registered
at node M2, represented by M2(10). Back-tracing
thus commences from M2 to determine which failure
modes may have contributed to the deviation. A single
failure mode, P2B, is identified as directly influenc-
ing node M2. The failure mode P2F is disregarded
since it results in a small negative disturbance on
flow. The fault propagation is then followed to and
ceases at node M1, where an additional failure mode
(P1B) leading to a large negative deviation is deter-
mined. The back-tracing procedure therefore follows
the route
M2ð10Þ ! P2B
M2ð10Þ !M1ð10Þ ! P1B
4 CASE STUDY
The feasibility of the fault diagnostic strategy is
reviewed through application to a simulation test
bed of an aircraft fuel system. The digraph technique
is considered suitable for modelling the clear flow
routes in the fuel rig system. As mentioned in the
introduction, the purpose of a fuel system is reliably
to provide an adequate amount of clean fuel at the
right pressure to the engines during all phases of
flight and manoeuvres. The fuel rig utilized incorpor-
ates a stainless steel frame supporting three active
supply tanks. The complete configuration of the fuel
rig is representative of a modern aircraft fuel system,
illustrating the flow of fuel from the main and auxili-
ary tanks to the engine. The rig recreates the function
of a general aircraft fuel system through using water
instead of kerosene. The fault diagnostic strategy is
tested across all modes of operation.
4.1 The fuel rig system
The general layout of the fuel rig is illustrated in Fig. 3.
The three active supply tanks – main, wing, and col-
lector – have two associated pump trays. Each tray
encompasses a peristaltic pump, pressure relief valve,
powered and manual isolation valves, and a pressure
regulating valve.
The main tank represents the core group of tanks
on an aircraft. Two pumps, connected in parallel,
pump water from the main tank to the collector
Fig. 2 Simple back-tracing example
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tank. The auxiliary storage tanks of an aircraft fuel
system are represented by the wing tank. In a similar
manner to the main tank, two parallel pumps transfer
water from the wing tank to the collector tank. A large
single tank at the base of the fuel rig represents an
aircraft engine. Fuel feeding to the engine (repre-
sented by the engine tank) is conducted via fluid
transfer from the collector tank through a pair of par-
allel connected pumps. A final pump, the centrifugal
refuel pump, transfers water back into the active sup-
ply tanks from the engine tank. Complete drainage of
the fuel rig system is conducted through utilizing the
engine tank drain valve. The three active supply tanks
are also connected to the engine tank via manually
operated dump valves.
In order to monitor system behaviour and obtain
the system status, data are retrieved from three types
of sensors associated with the tank sections. Level,
flow, and pressure transmitters are employed in the
fuel rig system. The actual readings detected by the
transmitters are classified into categories as follows.
1. Level transmitter: high, low, within normal bound-
ary, pump shut-off, or empty. There are two addi-
tional levels associated with the collector tank;
thresholds one and two are of relevance when
considering the ACTIVE operating mode, as des-
cribed next in section 4.1.1.
2. Pressure transmitter: pressure, no pressure, or
partial pressure.
3. Flow transmitter: flow, no flow, or partial flow.
4.1.1 Modes of operation and component
failure modes
There are three main modes of operation associated
with the fuel rig system.
1. ACTIVE: fluid is transferred from the collector
tank to the ‘engine’ (engine tank). The tank pumps
are switched on, and powered isolation valves
opened. As the collector tank level (CTL) decreases,
fuel transfer from the wing and main tanks to the
collector tank commences in the following manner.
(a) Phase one: CTL above threshold one: no
transfer from main and wing tanks.
(b) Phase two: CTL below threshold one and above
threshold two: transfer from wing tank only.
If wing tank at ‘pump shut-off’, transfer from
main tank.
(c) Phase three: CTL below threshold one and
above pump shut-off level: transfer from
main tank given main tank level is above
‘pump shut-off’.
2. DORMANT: system is in standby mode; no fuel
transfer occurs between the active supply tanks
and the engine. The tank pumps are switched off
and powered isolation valves shut.
3. DRAIN: system is drained of fluid. Fuel transfer
commences from the main, wing, and collector
tanks to the engine tank via their specific drain
valves.
There are 43 types of component failure modes
considered in the analysis, whichmay affect the func-
tionality of the fuel rig system.Each component failure
mode is allocated a code which contains the relevant
component identification number from the engineer-
ing illustration of the fuel rig system. The majority of
the failure modes (30) are associated with one of six
valve categories. The valve genres comprise pressure
relief, powered isolation, pressure regulating, block
bleed, and drain. All of the valve classes can fail
blocked or leaking. Partial blockage failures affect all
valves apart from those in the block bleed category.
In addition, pressure relief, powered isolation, block
bleed, and drain valves can fail either open or closed.
A final failure, only associated with the pressure relief
and powered isolation valves, involves failing stuck in
an intermediate position.
Fig. 3 General fuel rig layout
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The peristaltic pumps, located in each active sup-
ply tank feed line, have four related failure modes,
while the centrifugal pumps, utilized in both fuel
transfer and refuel, have three. The pumps can fail
on, shut off, or leaking. A further failure mode only
associated with the peristaltic pumps involves a
mechanical failure. There are two tank failure modes
(tank ruptured or leaking) in addition to four possible
pipe component failures (rupture, leakage, complete
or partial blockage).
The component failure modes referenced in the
modelling section (section 4.2) and their respective
codes are highlighted in Table 1.
4.2 Modelling and diagnostic implementation
4.2.1 Fuel rig digraph development
Steps one and two from the digraph procedure, pre-
viously described in section 2, are used to develop
the fuel rig system digraph. The system is split into
four sub-units consisting of the main, wing, collector,
and engine tank sections. Each section includes the
actual tank and associated components. The respect-
ive sub-unit digraphs are joined at common process
variables in order to form the overall system digraph.
In total, the system digraph is constructed from 842
nodes, of which there are 151 process variable nodes
and 691 component failure mode nodes. For a more
detailed description of the development process
involved in generating the fuel rig system digraph,
the reader is directed to reference [18].
As a brief means of illustrating the development
process involved in generating the fuel rig digraph, a
detailed section of the main tank is depicted in Fig. 4.
The main tank pump trays incorporating two powered
isolation valves (IVP0110/IVP0120), back pressure
valves (BP0110/BP0120), a flow transmitter (FT0110),
and interconnecting pipe work are illustrated.
A section of the respectivemain tank digraph is pre-
sented in Fig. 5. The alphanumeric codes contained
within the digraph nodes represent system process
variables and component failure modes, as previously
described in section 2. The fuelmass flow in trays 0110
and 0120 is indicated by the routes incorporating
nodes M106!M108 and M114!M116 respectively.
The two mass flow paths are connected by an AND
gate (vertical line) before leading to node M117. This
represents the joining of the tray lines at pipe 117.
The component failure modes considered to affect
the functionality of the fuel rig system are identifiable
in Fig. 5 through the manner in which they feed into
their associated process variable nodes.
The relationship between M106 and M107 rep-
resents the powered isolation valve IVP0110. If the
valve is closed by the operator then the relationship
(0: IVP110C) between the two mass flow nodes is
nullified. Similarly, the back pressure valve BP0110
is represented by the ‘þ1’ edge joining M107 with
M108. The mass flow nodes have at least four asso-
ciated failure modes which are related to four identi-
fied pipe faults: partial or complete blockage,
rupture, or leakage. Additional failure modes are
dependent on the presence of further components,
such as valves.
4.2.2 System fault diagnostics
In order to enable a more thorough system invest-
igation, consideration of dynamic effects is required.
The main area of focus when considering system
dynamics relates to abrupt fault analysis [19]. Abrupt
faults represent dramatic changes in a system and
can therefore result in a significant visible deviation,
known as a transient, from the normal system operat-
ing mode. In time, the system can be observed mov-
ing into a new ‘steady state’ owing to the deviation.
This is synonymous with the fuel rig system changing
scenario when assumed to be in one of the operating
modes. The term ‘scenario’ in the fuel rig analysis
relates to an altered system status based on the
retrieved transmitter readings.
A necessary strategy is to analyse system behaviour
at frequent intervals in order to perform diagnostics
Table 1 Component failure modes
Code* Component failure mode
P_B Pipe blocked
P_R Pipe ruptured
P_PB Pipe partially blocked
P_L Pipe leakage
IVP_C Powered isolation valve failed closed
IVP_B Powered isolation valve blocked
IVP_O Powered isolation valve failed open
IVP_PB Powered isolation valve partially blocked
IVP_S Powered isolation valve failed stuck
IVP_L Powered isolation valve leakage
BP_B Back pressure valve blocked
BP_PB Back pressure valve partially blocked
BP_L Back pressure valve leakage
*Where _ is replaced by the component ID number.
Fig. 4 Main tank section
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and identify if the system has shifted from its normal
operating mode. This strategy involves monitoring
the fuel rig system and determining if the system is
in an abnormal scenario. This does not, however,
include scenarios that would be expected during fault
rectification. Data are retrieved according to a set
sampling rate. The dynamic effects of faults are
investigated through the monitoring of tank levels,
in particular the rate of change in levels.
The following statements are assumed during the
diagnostics procedure.
1. All transmitters provide reliable readings.
2. For full flow and no flow registered deviations at
the flow transmitters FT0110 (main tank), FT0210
(wing tank), or FT0310 (collector tank) a fault
must have occurred in both tank feed lines. The
transmitters are located at the flow exit points
from each tank section.
3. For partial or minor flow deviations, of gains –5
or 1, a failure must have occurred in at least
one of the tank feed lines.
The diagnostic program, coded in MATLAB, can be
subdivided into four main sections, namely input,
comparison, fault diagnostics, and output. During
the ‘input’ stage the individual fuel rig transmitter
readings and assumed operating mode of the fuel
rig are ‘read into’ the program by way of a text file.
The expected fuel rig operating mode state is
determined in the ‘comparison’ section through
considering the individual tank levels. Should the
fuel rig be in the ACTIVE mode then the collector
tank level is used in order to determine which
ACTIVE phase, as detailed in section 4.1.1. Specific
rules are employed for all of the operational modes
as a means of providing consistency. These rules
relate to the tank levels and in turn the flow readings
that would be permissible for a given situation. The
expected readings for a known operating mode
may therefore be altered depending on the level
information.
1. If any tank level is at or below pump shut-off (PSO)
level, expect readings of no flow and no pressure at
the respective flow and pressure transmitters in
the tank section.
2. If the CTL is high, expect no flow out of the main
and wing tanks.
3. If there is flow out of a tank (via pipes) and the
level is below PSO, all failures are assumed to
result from the flow out, not an actual tank failure
(e.g. fracture).
A deviation matrix [D] is formed at the end of the
‘comparison’ phase by comparing the retrieved
transmitter data with those readings expected under
the assumed fuel rig system operating mode. For
identical readings, an element in the deviation matrix
that corresponds to the relevant transmitter is allo-
cated the value ‘0’. This indicates the presence of a
non-deviating sensor and it is assumed no failures
are present in the corresponding specific section of
the fuel rig. For deviating readings a respective ele-
ment in [D] is assigned a value which is consistent
with the noted deviation (e.g. þ10). On generating
the deviation matrix the next phase in the process
revolves around determining transmitter flags for
non-deviating readings. This is split into two steps:
first, whole tank section flags and, second, individual
transmitter flags.
The back-tracing procedure is re-enacted through
using matrices which contain the individual com-
ponent failure mode results for a given transmitter
deviation. The number of flags signed ‘1’, repres-
enting system deviations for given tank sections and
transmitters, dictates which back-tracing results
should be ANDed.
Fig. 5 Section of main tank digraph
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The tank level data are used to calculate the rate
of change in the fuel rig tank levels. These calcula-
tions are performed after data are retrieved from the
second sampling interval. The rate of change in tank
heights is used during the ‘fault diagnostics’ section.
For specific cases where no flow is registered in the
tank feed lines, then the rate of change in tank level
is utilized to determine whether there has been a
pipe blockage (or valve closure/pump shut-down)
or pipe rupture. A rupture, unlike a blockage, would
lead to a decreasing tank level.
Each fuel rig tank section is linked to specific output
text files which contain the diagnostic results for the
given transmitter deviations. From engineering knowl-
edge, it is assumed more probable for fault combina-
tions of the lowest order to be the cause for a noted
set of deviations.
4.2.3 Results obtained for a given dynamic scenario
The transmitter data presented in Table 2 contain a
sample from a set of readings retrieved over intervals
of 30 s. The fuel rig is assumed to be set in the ACTIVE
mode. Given that the height of the CTL is less than
threshold one but greater than threshold two, fluid
transfer is expected to flow from the wing tank to
the collector tank (ACTIVE phase two). The expected
system readings are illustrated above the retrieved
transmitter interval data. The actual data exhibit a
single deviation (highlighted in bold in Table 2) in
the wing tank section. The codes contained within
Table 2 are defined in the associated table key.
Upon reading the retrieved operational data from
the fuel rig into the program, results are output for
each interval. For intervals 1 and 2 the presence of a
single deviation in the wing tank and the absence of
deviations in the main and collector tank sections
are noted. The flow transmitter FT0210 detects the
deviation ‘no flow’, however, the expected operat-
ing mode readings are recorded by the pressure
transmitters PT0110 and PT0120. From the given
deviation, the diagnostic program assumes faults
are present in a section of the wing tank incorporat-
ing the feed lines between transmitters FT0210 and
PT0110/PT0120. The results are output in two text
files: one outlines the multiple faults achieved
when back-tracing from the flow transmitter node
past the ‘AND’ gate in the digraph through both
tank feed lines (results for each line are ANDed);
the second highlights the single failure causes
located in the wing tank section between the join-
ing of the two feed lines and the flow transmitter.
In total, 83 failure causes are noted for the wing
tank section deviations – two first order and 81 sec-
ond order.
Through taking into consideration the ‘static’ wing
tank level recorded between intervals one and two, it
is feasible to reduce the number of failure combina-
tions yielded for the given scenario. The rate of
change in height of the wing tank level is used to
distinguish between and ‘hone in on’ failures that
may be the cause for the noted deviation. The zero
rate of change in tank level indicates the occurrence
of faults incorporating blockages or closures. Con-
versely, a negative rate of change along with ‘no flow’
at FT0210 would suggest the presence of rupture
faults. Taking the rate of level change into account
generates 37 failure combinations – one first order
and 36 second order – as illustrated in Table 3. The
noted failures are associated with pipe or valve
blockages (P__B, BP__B, IVP__B) and valve closures
(IVP__C).
As a means for establishing the most probable
cause of failure, reliability theory regarding unavail-
ability functions and importance measures is utilized
in order to rank the failure combinations yielded for a
deviating scenario. Generic failure rate data are
obtained in order to quantify the unavailability of rel-
evant fuel system components for a given scenario.
The ranking of the failure combinations is deter-
mined through application of the Fussell–Vesely
probabilistic measure of minimal cut set importance.
The potential failure cause combinations (cut sets)
are given a numerical rating, with the highest being
deemed the most likely cause of failure. The import-
ance measure is defined as the probability of occur-
rence of a cut set given that the system has failed in
its deviated state (QSYS). QSYS is calculated using the
Table 2 Fuel rig transmitter data
Main tank Wing tank Collector tank
Assumed
ACTIVE
mode Level
Drain
flow
Feed
line
flow
Feed line
pressure Level
Drain
flow
Feed
line
flow
Feed line
pressure
Level Drain
flow
Feed
line
flow
Feed line
pressure
ACTIVE RL NF NF NP < RL & > PSO NF F P < T1 & > T2 NF F P
Interval 1 RL NF NF NP < RL & > PSO NF NF P < T1 & > T2 NF F P
Interval 2 RL NF NF NP < RL & > PSO NF NF P < T1 & > T2 NF F P
NF ¼ no flow; NP ¼ no pressure; T1 ¼ threshold one; F ¼ flow; P ¼ pressure; T2 ¼ threshold two; PF ¼ partial flow;
RL ¼ required level; and PSO ¼ pump shut-off.
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rare event approximation as opposed to calculating
an exact value. No difference has been noted in the
ranking of the cut sets when considering either the
rare event or exact values for QSYS. Furthermore, for
cases whereby many cut sets are produced, it is com-
putationally demanding to determine an exact value
for QSYS.
For the results noted in Table 3, the top five ranked
failures and their respective numerical ratings are:
(a) P217B: 0.940;
(b) IVP210B.IVP220B: 0.020;
(c) BP210B.IVP220B: 0.015;
(d) IVP210B.BP220B: 0.015;
(e) BP210B.BP220B: 0.011.
For the given deviating scenario, a manual isola-
tion valve located in pipe 217 in the fuel rig test bed
was closed as a means of simulating a pipe blockage.
It is noted that the actual injected fault (P217B) is
ranked at the top of the retrieved failure list. In addi-
tion to the ranking procedure, final human interven-
tion with the ability to call on engineering knowledge
and experience will target the most probable failure
modes.
5 DISCUSSION
As a means for determining the effectiveness of
the application of digraphs in fault diagnostics, fail-
ures are injected into the fuel rig system. The fuel
rig operator is able to override manually specific
functions and thus simulate scenarios which are
altered from the normal operating mode of the sys-
tem. For example, it is possible to close a manual
valve in one of the tank feed lines so as to replicate
a pipe blockage situation. The retrieved fuel rig read-
ings are then compared with those expected in order
to determine the component failure modes that
may have led to the registered deviation(s). Having
the ability to inject faults into the system yields the
capacity to test the diagnostic strategy thoroughly.
Table 4 illustrates the deviations associated with five
fuel rig test cases. The actual injected fault(s) and
the number of failure modes determined are also
highlighted. It is noted that for all of the test cases
the actual injected fault is generated as a probable
cause.
The key issue with the diagnostic strategy lies
within distinguishability. Numerous fault options
may be retrieved for a given scenario. During these
cases, reliability theory and human knowledge have
to be called upon in order to highlight the ‘most
probable’ cause. The addition of further transmitters
into the system would allow for increased isolability.
A compromise has to be found, though between the
over-complexity issues involved in the addition
of further sensors and the precise identification of
failures.
Table 3 Wing-tank section fault diagnostic results
Single failure P217B
OR
Multiple failure (a) P209B, BP210B, P208B,
IVP210B, IVP0210C, P207B
AND
Multiple failure (b) P216B, BP220B, P215B,
IVP0220C, IVP0220B, P214B
Table 4 Fuel rig scenario results
Test case Injected fault(s) Registered deviations No. of faults determined
1 Main tank Main tank 16:
Both tray powered isolation valves open Feed line flow transmitter: Flow 1 second order
Both tray peristaltic pumps on Feed line pressure transmitter: Pressure 6 third order
9 fourth order
2 Wing tank Wing tank 10:
Pipe rupture at location 217
(open globe valve to simulate)
Feed line flow transmitter: No flow 1 first order
9 second order
3 Main tank Main tank 2:
Tank rupture (open main tank drain
valve to simulate)
Level transmitter: Decreasing level 2 first order
4 Main tank Main tank 2 (main tank):
Tank rupture Level transmitter: Decreasing level 2 first order
49 (collector tank):
Collector tank Collector tank 13 first order
Single tray powered isolation valve shut Feed line flow transmitter: Partial flow 36 second order
5 Main tank Main tank 16 (main tank):
Both tray powered isolation valves open Feed line flow transmitter: Flow 1 second order
Both tray peristaltic pumps on Feed line pressure transmitter: Pressure 6 third order
9 fourth order
Collector tank Collector tank 49 (collector tank):
Single tray powered isolation valve shut Feed line flow transmitter: Partial flow 13 first order
36 second order
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The readings obtained from the fuel rig system are
subdivided into categories depending on the trans-
mitter variable under investigation. In order to over-
come the issue regarding the sensitivity of fuel rig
transmitter readings to high-frequency influences
such as noise, set boundaries are constructed for nor-
mal pressure (or flow), no pressure (or no flow), and
partial pressure (or partial flow). Thresholds for the
level, flow, and pressure readings are determined so
as to prevent ‘false alarms’ with regards to registered
deviations.
Digraphs provide a suitable method for repres-
enting relationships between entities, and are consid-
ered a useful tool in modelling the information flow
within systems. It is this characteristic which makes
digraphs appropriate for the fuel rig case study. While
conducting testing no discrepancies were noted bet-
ween the digraph model and physical system under
investigation. This can be attributed to the fact that
the fuel rig system digraph is developed from a
detailed piping and instrumentation illustration. Dis-
crepancies may be evident if numerous system vari-
ables (e.g. mass flow, temperature) are to be taken
into account at a given location in the digraph model.
On dealing chiefly with mass flow relationships
in the fuel rig digraph, the diagnostic back-tracing
procedure is sufficient for the given system since
transmitter readings are taken downstream of pro-
spective failure locations. It may, however, be neces-
sary to consider ‘forward-tracing’ when reviewing
applications with numerous complex relationships
which span across subsystems. The incorporation of
‘flagging’ into the diagnostics process eradicates the
potential for inconsistent failure mode results and
anomalies. ‘Flagging’ therefore acts as a form of con-
sistency check and removes the possibility of con-
flicting results between non-deviating transmitter
nodes and failure modes yielded through back-
tracing from specific deviating nodes. This process
is adapted when considering the dynamics of a sys-
tem. For scenarios whereby a tank level is noted to
be within an abnormal boundary in consecutive
intervals, if the rate of change in height of the tank
level is a non-negative value, it is assumed that the
tank failure has been rectified and therefore the devi-
ation is masked. For example, consider a low wing
tank level with a decreasing rate of change in the first
interval. If the tank failure is rectified, a low level is
still likely to be retrieved in the second interval. The
low level is, however, considered a non-deviation.
The current application system does not incorpor-
ate an integrated control loop structure. Adaptations
are conducted on the main tank section of the fuel
rig to assess the viability of both modelling systems
(and their associated control loops) and performing
fault diagnostics from the resulting digraph. A level
control system, consisting of two negative feedforward
loops, is incorporated into themain tank. The digraph,
generated for the revised main tank section, success-
fully models the process flow structure of the system
under investigation, and thus application of the
digraph-based diagnostic strategy is feasible. Prelim-
inary research is encouraging, with regard to the
determined back-tracing results when considering
both reliable and unreliable level switches and control
units.
The method ultimately illustrates the potential for
application to an actual aircraft fuel system compris-
ing a built-in control loop structure, thus addressing
some of the issues surrounding scalability of the
method. On application of the method to an actual
aircraft fuel system, it is felt that individual digraphs
are to be developed for specific operating modes in
order to prevent the generation of unwieldy models.
The application of the digraph models in the fault
diagnostics process for each operating mode will
thus be conducted separately. It will, however, be
necessary to verify the models through conducting
analytical testing.
To address the issues raised in the introduction
regarding fuel systems, modelling of the fuel storage
and distribution sections is conducted using nodes
representing mass flow. The edges which connect the
nodes indicate the mass flow routes within the system.
It is unclear whether digraphs are suited to modelling
other aircraft systems, more specifically the avionics
sections. The flight management system (FMS) is con-
sidered an avionics component, the primary function
of which is to assist pilots in planning, navigation,
and aircraft control functions. The range and variety
of data that must be taken into account imply that it
may be difficult to represent the associated data using
the standard notation for nodes and edges. A method
for overcoming this noted limitation is likely to involve
the employment of unique nodes and connection
types.
6 CONCLUSIONS
Digraphs provide a clear representation of the rela-
tionships between system variables since they clo-
sely reflect the physical structure of the system
under investigation. The discrete values used to
describe the relationships between nodes have
proved to be sufficient with the addition of ‘þ/ 5’
enabling the introduction of partial failures. This
adaptation overcomes one of the noted limitations
of the established digraph development procedure
with regard to the misrepresentation of some variable
relationships. Given the relatively straight forward
transfer of fluid process of the fuel system, discrepan-
cies between the model of system behaviour using
the digraph and the actual behaviour have been
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minimal and easily eradicated via testing. Models for
other systems may require a more detailed verifica-
tion process.
The rate of change in height of a particular tank level
is utilized to distinguish between and ‘hone in on’ fail-
ures that may be the cause for a given deviation. This
has proved successful in cases where there are regis-
tered deviations of no flow and no pressure. A noted
negative rate of change highlights pipe rupture faults.
Conversely, a positive or zero rate of change indicates
the presence of faults incorporating blockages or clo-
sures. A mechanism to further identify the ‘most like-
ly’ causes of a registered deviation is required. Focus
is to be based on the weighting of failure modes
through using previous data from maintenance logs.
There is also the provision to investigate the import-
ance of the type and location of transmitters providing
relevant system information. Issues associated with
the fault diagnostic strategy have been addressed and
detailed in the previous (discussion) section.
The results from the application of the automated
diagnostics process, based on the digraph method,
to the fuel rig system have been proven to be credible.
Injecting faults into the fuel rig has allowed various
scenarios to be tested using the diagnostic method.
Valid failure mode results are obtained when consid-
ering single or multiple faults in either individual
tank sections of the fuel rig or across the whole sys-
tem. This in turn leads to the applicability of the
method in a complex system comprising an actual
aircraft fuel system.
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